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MARILYN R. HALES, Widow;
DELBERT R. HALES, MONICA M.
HALES, and CRISTAL E. HALES,
Minor Dependent Children; and
ROBYN L. CHAMBERS, Former Wife;
of DAVID K. HALES, deceased,
Case No. 920319
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vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
EMERY MINING CORPORATION and
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,

Priority No. 7
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DETERMINATIVE STATE/RULE
The applicable determinative statutory provisions are Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1979), Section 35-1-68 (1979) and
Section 25-1-70 (1980).

They are set forth in applicable part as

follows:
Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-67 (2) (1981)
(2) For permanent total disability compensation
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation
shall be 662/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at
the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than
85% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury.
(b)
Compensation per week may not be less
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent
child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not exceeding the maximum established in
Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum
weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b)
shall be 36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) 1979)
(2) If injury causes death within a period of six
years from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70 (1981)
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to
additional benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in

I

its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but
the liability of the employer or insurance carrier
involved shall not be extended, and the additional
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund
provided for in subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although

Reply

Briefs

are

not

required

to

respond

to

Respondent's Statement of Facts, Respondent's Brief contains an
alleged Statement of Facts which is potentially prejudicial so it
should not go unchallenged.
In their Statement of Facts, Respondents allege that Mr. Hales
died as a result of "acute intoxication" from a combination of
drugs and they attach, without citation to the Record, a copy of
his Autopsy Report.

Respondents' statement has the appearance of

indicating fault on the part of the deceased worker which could be
construed as an improper attempt to prejudice this Court on a nonissue before it. Petitioners submit that it is their position that
the drugs which caused Mr. Hales' death were lawfully prescribed
for him, and that there is medical evidence establishing that his
overdose was directly and causally related to his industrial
accident.

However, this is an issue, perhaps, for another day.

This case as always been treated as one of pure law, i.e., the
constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2)
(1979), and this Court should not be distracted by unsubstantiated
allegations of fault on the part of the deceased worker.

Such

allegations involve an issue of liability which is not presented in
the present Petition for Review.

2

ARGUMENT
I
PETITIONERS HAVE
REINSURANCE FUND.

NO

CLAIM

AGAINST

THE

EMPLOYERS

Respondents have chosen not to defend the rationale and
decision

of

the Administrative

Law Judge

or

the

Industrial

Commission in issuing their respective Orders denying Petitioners'
claims.

In fact, Respondents Emery Mining Corporation and Energy

Mutual Insurance Company, responded to the Petitioners' Motion for
Summary Disposition on July 10, 1992 essentially conceding that the
challenged

statute constitutes an unconstitutional statute of

repose in violation of the Utah State Constitution as interpreted
by this Court in Velarde v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 123 (Utah
App.

1992).

In

addition,

Respondent

Industrial

Commission

indicated in its Denial of Motion for Review of May 6, 1992, that
it was "...apparent that Section 35-1-68 (2) is likely to be
declared unconstitutional."
Instead, Respondents, Emery Mining Corporation and Energy
Mutual Insurance Company, have alleged an entirely novel argument
raised for the first time in their Brief on Appeal to sustain the
patently unconstitutional statute of repose contained in Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-68

(2) (1979).

The sole argument of

Respondents now is that the challenged statute is constitutional
because Petitioners have an alternative industrial claim for death
benefits, namely, a claim against the Employers Reinsurance Fund
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70
(1981).

1

However, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70 (1981) provides
as follows:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to
additional benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in
its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but
the liability of the employer or insurance carrier
involved shall not be extended, and the additional
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund
provided for in subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68.
(Emphasis added).
This is a novel and entirely unprecedented argument.

The

primary problem with Respondents argument is that Section 35-1-70
(1979) by it's own terms is limited to "wholly dependent persons,
who have been receiving the benefits of this title...."
added]

[Emphasis

Petitioners as allegedly dependent survivors have neither

directly nor indirectly received any benefits under the Utah
workers compensation scheme. Respondents claim that the fact that
since

the deceased worker was receiving when he was alive an

additional

$5 per

week

for his

permanent, total

disability

compensation check for his dependent spouse and each dependent
minor child, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67
(1981), that his spouse and minor children were receiving the
"benefits of the act". However, this argument fails for at least
two reasons:
First, there is no evidence that any portion of Mr. Hales'
weekly permanent, total disability check sent to him while he was
alive included an additional dependents' allowance.

In fact,

Petitioners submit that his check did not include additional

1

dependents' allowance because he was earning well in excess of the
state average weekly age at the time of his industrial accident;
and, therefore, he was entitled to the maximum weekly rate without
the additional dependents7 allowance being considered.
Second, it was clearly Mr. Hales who was receiving the
"benefits of the act" on his claim - not his dependents.

Even if

Mr. Hales received an additional amount on his weekly compensation
check

because

he

had

dependents,

this

does

not

mean

that

Petitioners were receiving the "benefits of the act" as dependents
of a deceased worker - an entirely separate claim.
supra.

See Velarde,

See also Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 416

(Utah 1986) and State Industrial Insurance System v. Lodge, 822
P.2d

664

(Nevada

1991).

Petitioners

had

no

individual

or

independent claim to Mr. Hales' benefits while he was alive, and
there

is

no

evidence

that

they

have

received

compensation benefits occasioned by his demise.

any

workers

In fact, such

benefits have been denied on the basis of the six year statute of
limitations which is being challenged on constitutional grounds in
this appeal.
Under

the

Respondents'

rational

any

dependent

receives

"benefits of the Act" when their provider - when living - receives
benefits in his or her own right. There is absolutely no authority
either by Rule, case law or practice and procedure which would
support this interpretation and Respondents cite none.

The plain

fact is that Petitioners have no claim against the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund and will receive no compensation at all unless
5

this Court declares the six (6) year statute of repose contained in
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979) unconstitutional.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund is not a party to this action
and the Respondents have taken no action, either at the Industrial
Commission

level

or

on

Appeal,

to

join

it

as

a

party

Defendant/Respondent. The argument of the Respondents, if accepted
by this Court, would increase the liability of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund and change existing policy and procedure, all
without the opportunity of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to
appear and argue against such a new proposed liability.

CONCLUSION
This case presents a question of pure law; i.e., whether Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979) providing for a six year
statute of limitations constitutes an unconstitutional statute of
repose when applied to dependents of injured workers who die more
than six years after the industrial accident allegedly causing
death.

For the reasons stated above and contained in their

original Brief, Petitioners urge this Court to find the statute
unconstitutional and remand for further adjudication of their
claims.
In the alternative, and assuming that this Court is of the
opinion that the constitutional challenge to Section 68 may be
defective for the reason that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may
be separately liability for death benefits, this Court should
remand this case to the Industrial Commission for the purpose of
6

joining the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to allow it to respond to
Respondents' argument regarding liability on behalf of the Fund
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Secti<Jn^35^vt><70 (1981)y
DATED this 9th day of November,/ 1992.
^BNEY & DABNBY, /p.l
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
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Utah Court of Appeals
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